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Chapter ll
Practicing Imperfect Forgiveness
Abst act Forgileness is typically rega.dcd as a good thin8 
- 
even a vinue but
acrs of forsileness can vary widely in value, depending on $eir conrcxr and moti-
larion. Faced with this variation, philosophers have lended lo reinlorce everyda)
concepts of forgiveness with slricl sels ofconditions, crcating ideals or paradigms
of forgiveness. These are mcant to dislinguish good or praiscworthy instances o1
forgivcness from problematic instances and, in panicular, to pftnecr the sclf-respecl
ofwould-be forgivers. But pffadigmadc foryiveness is problcmatic fora number of
reasons, including ils inauention ro forgaveness as a gendcred lrait. Wecm accounr
for fte values and thc risks associated wilh forgiving far bcrtcr ifwe trear it as moral
pmcrice and not an idcal.
Keyworals Fo.givencss Resentment Self respecl . Gendered ! inue Feminisrn
11.1 The Value(s) of Forgiveness
Forgiveness has enjoy€d !n unprecedented surge of academic cnlhusiasm in the
last few decad€s. We have lcarned that forgiveness is grrcd lor your hcalth
(Thoreson et al. 2000), good for your busincss (Kurzinski 1998), good for your inti-
mate relationships (Colenan 198), dd good for your polirics (Shriver lSg5, Turu
l99g, ArnsruD 2005). Accordi'g to seveml religious lradirions, forgiveness is also
gmd for your erernal soril. From clinical psychologisls and d€m()cralic reformers to
spiritual gurus and yoSa teachers, a surprising numb€r of authorities are suddenly
counseling individuals lhal $cy can 
- 
and even or8rr to 
- 
forgivc.
Despite the panoply ol benenb now associated with it, leminists may have rea-
sons !o regard an ethics of fbrgiveness .athe. wdrily. Allcr all, this spare offorgile-
ness promotion has lbllowed relatively quickly on ihc hccls of s€vcral significant
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liberarcry movemenrs. including the civil rights movement. second wave feminism,
and lhe rise ol queer politics. One would be fbrgiven (pardon the pun) for noting, as
Janicc Haaken does somewhat dryly 
- 
thatjust when 'oppressed groups gain the
snenglh to speak up and claim new rights, including the right to disengage frorn abu-
sive rclationships. the powertul rediscover the salutary vntue of forgiveness' (2002,
I84). At the very least, it is worth asking certain questions. mosl nolably: whar,
exactly. is being advocated, when women arc exhorted to forgivel Second, in prais-
ing ibrgiveness, whal alternadves ro forgiving do we Lhereby cririque? Some lear
thal in tb.gi!ing widely, we waive a raluable fbrm olmoral (and poUtical) pro€st.
Olhers worry thar the new erhics of tbrgiveress masks a more lamiliar and oppres-
sive paradigm in which women. in particular, are laught lhe values ofseh-sacrifice
and servility. or concern tbr olhers al the expense oftheir own rights. Given the gen'
dered hisbry of rhese supposed virtues. the dange.s of a new duty to forgive may
appear particularly acute from a feminisl perspective.
At the same time the intuitiveappeal oflbrgiven€ss is based on a vision olmoral
litt thal goes beyond formal duties and obligations 10 otherc. and which imbues
rclalionships as well as dghts with value and significance. Forgiveness recognizes
human imperfection drd our capacity for change and improvemenl. wben we for-
give. wc at least atlempl to engage in moral repairi that is, to restore and revitalize
moral relations between individuals in lhe atiermath ofwrong, |alher lhan to sever
them (walker 2006). This vision of r€pair is far from an anti-feminisl vision. In
odrer words, tbrgiveness may not be something we need eiih€r to promote or reject
absolutely. The problem-or problems-wi1h forgiveness arise from the simple fact
Ihat, at leasr according 10 many ordinary language uses ofthe term. we can forgive
in a wide ran8e ofcircumstances and for a widc range ofrea$ns. Some ofthese cir
cumstancos and rcasons arc beucr (c.g. saicr. Drore defensible, mo.e self respccdng,
more obviorlsly ,nr.rl) rhan others. That many acts ol fbrgiveness, a1 least tbr the
rime bcing, musr lake place in conrexts of uneven and otlen !njust power dynamics
only serves to underscore rhe point.
Faced with the unsurprising observation rhar acis of forgiveness vary in value,
philosophe.s of iorgiveness have respondcd by calling for (theoredcal) reinlorce'
ments. Clearly. forgiveness ought to be a moral action, they claim: not merely
in the sense thal ir is open to moral evaluation and may hold moral significance,
but moral in the sense of morally goo4 or praiseworthy. The lariable moral valuc
of our actual praclices of forgiveness is therefore in need of fteorerical clari6ca-
tion. Dividing themselves into 'boostels' and 'debunkers' of forgiveness (Murphy
2003), philosophers have, for the most part, either concentrated on shaping tbqive'
ness into a rarionally defensible moral ideal or have used exainples ol poor. risky
and seemingly immoral forgiveness lo unde.mine the polential value of forgive-
ness altogelher. This has led lo a narrow and often unhelplul set of dichohmics
nnd opposirions, which together liame the philosophical discoursc on folgive
ncss: eilhcr we resent wrongs or we lbrgive theni either forgiveness is conditional
on rhe wongdoer's repentance or ir is enrhely ll']conditioned; eirher forgiveness
emerges from a robust sense of self-respect or it is servile condonalion: either
tbrgileness matches 
- 
or at least resembles 
- 
a philosophical paradigm and is
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therefore genuine and praiseworlhy, or it is imperlect, immora!, or even 'pseudo
ln this paper, I wanl to explore how we might go about theorizing forgiveness. if
we begin by reiecting thosc dichotomies and the piclure of forgiveness as a noma-
rive ideal tiom wbich they arise. I do this lor severrl reasons: fi.st. I see the ettbrt to
articulate the periect paradignr olmoral lbrgivcncss as a doomed enrerprise. I ag.cc
$rrh MJrgrrer Wrl*er rnJr ir h Lnlr[(l] Ihdr rhrr. ,s 
".rnple c^nrcr rJrr ol ..{
giveness, in rhc way that there is a correcr theory of the st.ucture oi DNA' (2006.
152). Moreovcr, searching fbrsuch a fteory may be dangerous as wellas fulilc, iiil
prevenls us from attendiog to actual practices of {brgir'eness and fie naratives lold
by those who do (ordo noO iorgive, in circunstances and lbr reasons not contained
by philosopbical pamdigms. Il, as I suggesr, thc ncgleded narralives are most ofrcn
those belonging to members ofoppressed or subordinate social groups, this neglect
is particularly worrying. Finally, in absrracting lrom the messy details oftbrgivencss
as a practicc, philosopbical paradigms oftbrgiveness display some ofwhat Charles
Mills calls the vices ol idcal Lheory (Mills 2004, 166). I focus in panicular on the
role ofgcnde. in philosophicaldiscussions ol fb€iveness: fie problemalic absencc
(and presence) ofgender in phik)sophical paradigns and examples, and tbc ways in
which iorgiveness is implicirly gendcred' bolh in a(ributions and in expechrions.l
I make my argumenl in firee sugcs: firsl I olter a wide accounr oi forgileness
and contmst i1wi1h narow philosophical pradigms. Second. I cons ide. forgiveness
$ a poLentially gendered concepl, and dcmonsirate how ideals ot lorgiveness may
reinforce problematic gendcr assumptions. Finally, l consider what it might mean to
theorize non-ideal io.giveness, rhrcugh an extendcd mcditalion on a sho( passage
on women and tbrgiveness in Dostoyevsky.
11.2 Whaf Does (or Should) Forgiveness Mean?
I understand forgivencss first and lbremost as an evem or a 'happening': someone
lbrgivesi someone else is fbrgiven. Insolar as lbrgiveness is deliberative, ir is also
an actionrsomething we do, or ar leasr aim to do. Olcourse. 'forgiveness'may also
describe our disposition to pcrform acts oi forgiveness (or indeed, il io.giveness is
a virtue. to pcrlbrn rhem well): Robefls and Criswold have nicknamcd this trait
'tbrgivingness' while David Novitz speaks ofwhat it is ro b? forgiving'(1995,
2007, I 998). Forgiveness is whar tbrgivingness does- Fin:rlly. ;f acts ol iorgiveness
do 
€xpress impo ant ideals, we conld reLr to thesc ideals, roo, as tirrgiveness. Bur
lbrgiveness qra idealand forgiveness 4ua virlue borh depend upon fteact itseli: the
transformadon we intend in utlering phrases like'I tbrgive you.'
Whar do we do when we forgive? Most philosophen agree (har lorgiveness is a
pe.rorml(rather than an institutionalor oflicial) responsc to wrongfulharm.It is also
a generous or liberalreactioniaca offorgiveness mark adeliberate shitt from away
fiom a negative stance toward the wrongdoer or in some cases, the immediate
substilution ola positive stance tbr lhe expected negative on€, in the 6rst place This
shift in stance does nor dittuse o. ignore the wrongness of rhe oltense: lbrgivencss
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confronts wrongdoing for whd it is, and does not ry to explaio it away While efforb
to torgive may resemble cxcuses or justi6cations. ,niculatitrg a decision lo forgive
inclGs fte moredimcult task ofaccounting simultaneously for whv hostilitv might
be iustified and our willingncss lo forgo or rethink il 1am excused ifI am less
blamcwonhy for my aclion, but I am forgiven /or my blam€worthiness
In everyday language. what we recognize as acts of lorgiveness are also lvpi-
cally charactetizcd by certain alliludes, riluals and beha!iors, perceplions and even
utter€d phrases - but lhese may change, dcpending on the indiv;duals involved' the
relatbn;hip betwecn ihem, and the naturc ol $e offense.In some friendships much
is conl,eyed non-vcrballyia single gesture may convey apology and its acccptan'e'
ID other;elationships, words are a/l that is needed for both panies lo acccpt tba! for
givencss has ranspired. Cenainly, aileast (hefollowing cases are possible examples
ofwha( we mishr ordinarily refer lo as an act olibrgivencss:
(i) Ov€rcoming initialleelings ofrage, resenlmcnt and anger'
( ii) Coming ro believe the wrongdoe. is polentiallv more than the sum ofher acir
(iii) Tacitly or erpticirly Siving herpcrmission lo srop assessing herselfmorally in
lerms of thd one act.
(iv) Purposcfulty refraining from any relaliating behavior (including verbal
(v) Articulaling words of torgiveness, or participaling in some equivnlenl ritual'
wirh sincerity and Sood inlentions-(vi) Sincercly accepting an apology
(vii) Moving on lo a ncw. positi!€ relationship, following a breach of rhe old bv
wrongdoing.
Nol every possible way of characterizing forgiveness is lisled here of colrsc.
Thc list is mc;nt 10 be chalacieristic. noi exhaust;ve- Moreov€r. performing onc 01'
$cse aclrons in any particular siluation would not guarantec lbrgiveness: in a long_
standing, complcx tamily rctationship marked by disrust on bolh srdes words of
forgiveness alone might bc deeply unsa(isiving lor all corccrned ln a morc casual
or iormat rclationship, on the othcr hand, talk otovercoming 
'age 
and hatred mighl
actually exaggcrate and lossilize hosdlities, rather than t'ansform ihcm. especially
if the wrong in qucslion was rclarivelv ninor (Bolevn-Filzgerald 2002) Bul we
can cenainly imaginc lhat, in thc absencc ol reasons to ftink orherwise, tx-oPle
who pcrlbrmed one of these actions might t*e rhemselves to have forgilen - and
equaity, iI we wcre the recipients of such geslu.cs, w€ miSht understand ourselves
to be tbrgiven.
l'toreover. it seens to mc lhat il mall€rs wheher or nol lhose invollcd in an acl
of forgiveness undershnd it as such: ir may even delermine wbelh€r or not the acl
'..'nrs'. Here I rake issue with a recenl treahent of forgiveness' which begins wilh
thc claim: 'forgiveness has nol t'een given or r€ceiYcd. simply because one b€lieves
orfcelsrhal ithas been... rcgardless ofthe tevet of subjeclive conviction' (criswold
2007, xv). True, we can imaginc cases where indiYidualsare misaken ordeluded in
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thinking they have forgiven 
- 
but acts of forgivcncss also s€€ms lo funcdon symbol
ically wilhin a particular .elationship. We cannor dcpcnd entirely on s€lf-rcporting
perhaps bur 
- 
equally wc cannol enrirely cash out lhe enlire rncaning ofany act o
forgiveness in advance, any more than a disintcrcstcd obscrver can apprecialeelerl
gesture of love or apology, dislrusl or gradtudc, lrom the outside- Wc must also ir
cach case determine what il means to thc lorgiver and forgiven, by paying allentio!
to how the concept is used by those in snu (O'Shaughness! 196?).
Second, I disagree wift the dominant assumption among pbilosophers that 'for
giveness is primarily a matlcr of how I 
./€el aboul you (nol how I treat you)' (Mur
phy and Hampton 1988, 2l). Wharever clsc lbrgivcness may enrail, rhey argue, il
musl aL lcast involve a change in atlitudel the dclibclativ€ eflon b olercome war
ranbd .esentmenl and hostilily. undcrlakcn only l'or a prescribed scl of moralb
acceplable reasons. Virtuous o. ideal forgi\'cness is corlrional on one or morc oi
thcsc rcrsons most oflen, the wrongdoer s wholchca(ed and informed repenrance
Why rhe obsession with rcsentmenr? When philosophcrs take up fie qucsrion ol
tbrgivcness, lheydo so primarily ro probl€matizc its moralvalue, mosroften in rela.
tion to smndards ofjustic€ and s€lf-respecl (Murphy 1988, Novilz 1998, Hieronymi
20Ol)- In tailing to object sulllcienlly, some argue. the forSiving viclim appears rc
condone and cven collude;n her own wronSdoing. She docs not demonsrrarc appro,
priate self-respcct. Anicularing and promoting forSiveness may also undermine and
diminish fie potential moral insights of our 'neSative' rcactiors lo harm such as
anger, resenhcnt and blame (Boss 1997, Poler 2001, Quinn 2004). Since ft€ puF
pos€ of$cseenotions is (i) moralproresr and (ii) moral self'dctenle, rhey andnor
the tendency to forgive are priaa lacie \itt)ous rcsponscs !o wrong (Murphy 1988,
Brudholm 2m8). All thc therapcutic, physioloSical, straGgic and political benenrs
of forgiveness musr lake second place lo lhir protest. Only resentmcnt can geL th€
moraljob done. Moreover sincc forgiveness h a normalive concept, they argue, (i)
forgiveneiSmust b. premised on prior resentment and (ii) factors that promorc and
prolect norms ofiusrice and sclfrespect must eirhfi be 'wri cn in' to whal counts
as genu'ne forgivencss, or ldded as warraniing condilions lbr successful (genuine.
legirimatc, p.aiseworthy, etc.) occasions oi it. Undcrslanding ideal or paradigmaric
tbrgivcncs$ is simply a matter ofderernrining the appxrpriate ser ofconditions.2
I see this lbcus on thc cmotionaldimcnsion oiibrgivencss ds problemaric fo.two
reasons. First, it risks excluding or undennining fte ritualistic, behavioral and 
€ven
pragmatic elements ol forgiven€ss; lo fte pcrson being lbrgiven, how she is treaFd
by the forgiver may be ial more important than Murphy allows. B€ing 'let back
ir' may be as much a malrer of social gesture as it is a malter of deep emolional
rransformadon. Second, Murphy and those who iollow him lend ro idealize and
oversimplify resentmenr, allowing ir todo alllhc moralheavy liftingin the afrermarh
Murphy understands r€s€nrmenr almost cntirely in rerms of moral proresr. In
doing so, he follows Rawls, who dcllncs rescnrmcnr as a moral feeling lhal invokes
rhe concepr of righr' (1987,533). Res€nhcm is 8orxj. because il is clearly and
unproblematically tied to 'a non-conrovcrsially Sood thang- elf-resp€cf (Murphy
1988, l6). This philosophical defi nition of rcsentmenr is narower ftan our common
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usage and that is no1 necessarily a bad thing. The dilncuhy is that Murphy shifts
bcLween common underslandings ot' resenhenr (we naturally resent iniurics) and
Rawls' philosophical accounl (our resentmenL necessarily carries a morally robust
claim). Forexanrple, Murphy moles tooquickly from the fact that someone protesrs
an injury to $e assumption thal her protesl must be grounded in a robusr sensc oi
her own proper value, rather than say lear, need or desperation. Resentmenl
does not always and only express self'respect; people with deficienr or absent self-
respect may still resent harms and wrongs. Second, daily resenhents are often lied
to far less impressive norms rhan the concepr of(moral) 'righf. We resent t-ailures of
good manners, ofreciprocal social convenlions, evcn as Margaret Walker notes 
-
offasbion. like p€culiar hai.curs (2006, l2,l).
Walker remains mo.e laithtul ro common usage than Murphy does. when she
claims reseniment is an emotional weapon employed in rhe tace of threars to any
nunber ol cherished norms ( 128). The emotioral phenomenolo8y of rcsentment is
the same in each crsei our angry tbelings represenl a desire 
- 
a denand 
- 
(har $c
lansgressor ol somc norm be held accountable to that norm. $at she be mdlc to
acknowledge i1s force, ro regrel her violrtion. In othcr words, resenhent continues
lo behave as a r ctive auiludc (Strrwson 1993) whether lhe nolm in queslion is
strictly moral, social or customary. Some reseotmenrs are cases olrighteous indig
naiion: otheN emcrge tiom envy and insecurity. disgusr and disdain. Pcoplc can
resent the eflba 10 use inclusive languagc. renovations b older buildings to crca1e
acccssible spaces, or a gay pride parade marching down lbek street.
Thus, rcsentmcn! responds to the violation of norms but nor all norns are cre
ated equal. When we limil use of the term to instances where it is deployed to
defend uncontrolcrsial moral concepts, we risk seriously over-moralizing resenl-
ment (Walker, 127). This is not to discre4it icscntmenr enlirclyi it may well exprcss
moral prolest, as well as tunction as a witness lo wrong, or nn enorional rcllsal
to accept the i-act of iniusrice. Ir nay also express tear. insecuriry, misguided cnti
tlemenl, or atlachnent to probl€malic, exclusionary norms. A plausible accounr ol
resenimenl muslrecognize both possibilities.
InsGad of relying on resenlmenr to determine wherhcr and whcn lirgiveness
is w3rranted, we might examinc lypical acts of lorgiveness for what they tcll us
about rhe relation, o. changc in relarion, between the lbrgiver and forgilen. Tberc
are good reasons to lbcus on whal forgiveness prcduces as a potenljal source o{ its
value, and not me.ely on what il overcomes or erases. Claudia Card describes our
abiliry to forgive as a moral power,' capable of achi€ving something of moral s ign il-
icance (2002, 173). For Card. this achievement is the abilily 10 cope with the moral
remainders ofwrong: sufibring, guilt altd regrer. Hannah Arendr puts it another way:
forgiveness f.eer' the wrongdoer, by releasing her frorn lhe woNt consequences of
her wrcns (1958. 237). FoBiveness is meanr as, kind of /d/l€l walker chamc-
terizes ih€ restorxlive properties of forgiveness sUghtly ditferentlyi she lbcuser on
/epdn-rather rhan release (2006). Card, Walker and Arendt all emphasize raNard
kDking values ol hop! and trust in others, rhe pi:sumprion olgoodwill and rcspccr,
and the desire to rcst{)€ and improve relaLionships. To the extent that forgiveness
ir backward-looking, noreover. the forgiver may concern herselfas much with the
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brcach of a valuable relationship as she does with potenlial injuries to her self-
respecl. In other wo.ds, I suggest that we forsake a singular ideal of forgiveness and
redirecr our atlenlion outwards in two waysi 6rst. io recognizing fie variety ofways
in which people may forgive, and the wide range of expressions thaL fo.giveness
may take. Sccond, I suggest we focus on lbrgiveness or 'forgivenesseJ - as a
set of non hostle practices for negotiating wrongdoing that may express a nl!,nrer
of reparative aims: relief, release or rcconciliation. We ought to rc orient ourselves
away from the highesl ideal and down lo the ftreshold offorgiveness.
To those schooled in the philosophical discourse on forgiveness, il migbt appear
as though I have simply presented an incomplete catalogue oi usages lamiliar to
,r€, and not a philosophical account. Ordinary languagc is a far from unproblematic
methodology, ofcourset what is 'ordinary' to nre, in my cukure, class and circum-
slances. may bc far from ordinary to you. In lac1. i1 is precisely,"cadt usages vary
so widely, and in relation to variables ofcuhure. gendcr, race, class and hislorical
epoch, thal we ought Lo pay aitention to ihen. Acls of tbrgiveness respond to two
veryconcrete and immediate things: thc offense ilsell and th€ wrongdoer who com
mitled it.It is hardly surprisjng thar the meaning and phenomenology of forgiveness
will vary as widely as wrongs and wrongdoers do; providing an exhaustiv€ accounl
is probably beyond the reach of the almchair philosopher Bui this is no1 to say we
cannot make headway.In lhe following section,I considerone ptoblemalic variablei
gender
I 1.3 Gendered Forgiveness
Understanding torgiveness as amoral practice requires that we undersland ir asgen
dered, arnolg-other things. Men and women are encouraged lo express their gen_
der in a number ofwaysi these expressions vary across social classes and cultu.es.
and can change over time. The categories of'masculine' and 'feminine' identify
a shifting conplex of trails. behaviors, inages and social expectations. Cender is
also expressed ihrough moral norms. For example, Calipbell notes thar many of
our virtue and vic€ terms are gendered (Campbell 1994). Since gender concep(s
are 'persistent and powerful organizing categories of ihought,' it is hardly surpns'
ing that some ofour moral ideals are also gender ideals (Nodock 2009, l3). when a
vico or viriue term is gendered, itdoes not praise or censure uniformly: the same trail
may be praised in women and criticized in men. Campbell describes the'Kanlian
feninine'as an ideal ofemotional sensitivity and sentimentality: sympa$elic. del
icarc, compassionate and eNily oftended (1994, 56). These same tmits applied 10 a
man ofKanfs tilne 
- 
or ours 
- 
would not be unambiguously flattering. The 'Kandan
feminine' also calls to mind virginia woolf's specter of'The Angel io the House':
She was inrensely sympathelic. She was immensdly charning. She sas ullerly unselfish
She excelled in the diificull artsoffamily liie. She saclificcd hcNeltdaily... in shon she was
so con$ituted ihar she never had a nind oi a wish of her own, but piefefted to sympalhirc
always wilh the ninds and wisbes ofoters. Abole all I noed not say it she {as put.
(woolf 2008)
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As moral exemplars go. the Angel in lhe House is rot parlicularly cmpowering.
one iscrpccted to admirc her for whal she suffers and rtceives, nol what she dr€r or
achicvcs. Her virruc Iies in her own sclf-effacemenl: she is an exemplary moralagent
by hardly acring al all. Evenlually, Woolfconclud€s, lhe Angel must b€ el'minated:
I turncd upon her.ndcaughr hcr by the lhrcar I did ny ben to killher My cxcuse, iilwero
robchddupinacourtothw,souldberhltlloredinselfdcfcnsc.Hidlnorkilhdh she
world hrv€ kilhd me. {woolr2008)
Since the hisrory ofgender is also ! history of gender opprcssion, leminisrs have
good reason to be critical ofgendered virlues: lhe feminine virtues we.e also. tra-
ditionally, cxacdy rhose traits lhat suppos€dly rendered women unfit for the public
sphere and for political power As Claudia Card not€s, oppre.ssive sftial conditions
crn recasl and disguise moml damage and survival strategies wilh lhe honorific of
'!irtuc' (C0rd 1996. 53). ofcourse. r sur!ival strategy is not necessar;ly a wholly
barl thing, cither, insolar as u achicves just thari su.vival of its bearer under inhos
pilablc conditions. Id€ntitying a practice or trait as ieminine does not require that
we rcicct il allogerher (not all Angcls nced killing). but il does ale[ us to ask row.
as a Bendercd term. il is empbyed - and exactly what vision ol good' it apPars lo
k forgiveness a gendered cooccpt? For some, torgiveness is mosl at home in the
Chrisrian rcligious tr.dition, which counsels that ?ve,fore, male or female, ought
ro lbrgivc. U ev€ryone faces a similar cxpeclarion to toryive, cenainly, forgiveness
is xor gondercd or at leasr. not explicitly. Bul even wilhin a Christian contexi of
univcrsally advocated unconditional tbr!iven€ss, lhe story is not so simple. Judith
Boss norcs Lhar normalive uses ol tbrgivcness by Chrislian institutions Lcus on
ibrgiv€nc$s in tamilies, including abusivc and violent familics. Civen lhe dccidedly
gendercd nalure of domeslic violenco, Boss asserts, discussions of forgiveness
cannot bc leparated from gendet politics' (Boss 19S7, 235). As long as ibrgiveness
is advocdcd pdmarily 1o suslain abusivcand oppressive rela(ionships, its value can'
nor b€ separaled fron $e gendered violcnce it enablcs (I-amb 2002). In other words,
rhe obiects and focus of forgiveness may be gendered. Funhctmore, both Boss and
Anca Ghcaus remind us lhal lhe Chrislian argument for lbrgiveness is premis€d on
univcrsal lallibility and moral frailty 
- 
we lbryive orhers because we ourselves are
also sinncrs. and in need ol God s forgivcness 
- 
a remark chillingly reninisc€n1ofa
bn8 tradirion of victim-blam ing, in contexls ofdonestic and sexual violence (Boss
1997, Cheaus 2009). Gheaus nores that acco!ding to Chrisrian lheologian Paul Fid
d.s, in human rulrtionships no onc is an innocent parly.
There arc several go(d rcasoos rc bclicve that forgivcncss is Sendered or, at
leasr, lhat forgiveness as we undcrshnd il emerges from a profoundly gendered his-
1ory. Ceruinly, 'forgivingness' or lhe disposition Io forgive appcars at home wilh
orher 'solr' arrributes tradnionally coded as feminine: palience, carc, and sympa
fietic undcrstanding. Indeed, il is cxactly these aspecrs of forgiveness: that it is
tm soli, roo yiclding, too self-sacrificing, and lails toconfront othcrs appropriately.
rhar moli!'are many oflhe philosophrcal ohiections to forgiveness raised by Murphy
.rnd othcrs. Hann$ Arendl notcs lh{l tbrgiveness has been relegltcd to the pilatc,
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raftcr lhtn prhlic realm jusl as women wcrc 
- 
in parl becalse ol rhe ckxe arx)
ciation bcrween lbrgiveness and love ( 1958. 243). Ifrhe idealwoman is rcsponsible
for maintaining relarionships and for kccping dom€stic hamony, forgiveness will
regularly bc required of her.
In cha.acterizing the ideal woman. forgivingness has also lunctioned as a tool
for silcncing hcr more assertive counterparts. Sociery is tar quicker to castigate and
ro label the woman who will nol lugivc as ungry, biuei or shrewish lhan her malc
counterpa( 
- 
I phenomenon witncsscd mosl recently in Hilary Clinton's campaign
lbr the Democratic presidential nominarion. Media comnEntarors have remarked
thaL despirc her formidable legislative and polilical record, the single acl lhal !em,
porarily kepl Clinlon's campaign afloar was her willingness lo forgivc her hrsbandi
that single aclion redeemed her femininny sufiiciently for middle Amcrica. Sev,
eral rccent srudies in emp'rical psychology halc indicated thar willingncss to for-
gi\e divides along g€nd€r lines. and womcn are more inclined m lorgive lhan men
(Exline et al. 2008. Toussainr and Wobb 2005).4 Exline.emarks that thc sex dif-
l-ercnces they uncovered wer€ surprising und unexpecled (Exline er aI..2008). Of
course, rhose ol Lrs unwilling to acccpt gcndcr dichotomies as essenrial lnay casr a
critical cyc ovcr these studies, bul rhey reinlbrcc whal feminisrs have hng arguedt
in contemporary western societ), womcn urc more likely to be socializcd to culti
vate empa(hy and oarc, to sublimnE their needs and dgha to tholc ol an ongoing
relalionship. and ro rejecl negarive emotions ofang€r and resenrmcnl.s lr makes
sense rhal an inclinalion lo forgivc or a srnse ofits expectarion 
- 
mighl be part of
this socializarion. Given rhis social prussurc. and rhe hisroricalassociarion berweer
ibrgi!eness and s(rne culturally cncodcd sci oi'essenlial teminine characteristics,
women nray havc additlonalreasons ror () lbrgi!c, or ro resist renrS brgiving. Mur-
phy bcgins his diatribe againsr tirgiveness with ! quote f.om leininist autho. Fay
Wcldon: 'undcrsiand and Iorgive, my mothcr said. and the effofl hasquitcexhausled
mc' (Wcldoir 1988,5). Rather Ihan nking up rhc practice. many women may be
inrcrested ir leaving it b€hind.
Finally,I would suggesr that nolonly is our inherned concepr of lbrgivcness gen-
dered, bd lhe philosophical discoune on lbrgivenessand rhe paradigms ir8cncrares
are, ls well. Who forgives, in philosophical cxamples? For the mosl pan. phaloso-
phc.s wriring on lbrgiveness illuslrate rhcir clains wirh whar I think oi a! 'Smiih
and Joncs' cas$i the ligures remain shadowy, idcnti6ed only by the lerrcrs 'A and
'B' (Downic 1965, Harley 1991) or by singlc mrlc, Ango-Saxon nlmcsi 'Fred and
Ralph (Kolnai 1973) Smiih and Robinson' (Benn 1996), 'Als$n and Benneu'
(Haber l99l). Jcrryand Paul'(Boleyn-Fitzgcrald 2002)orindeed. remain nameless
but nelcrrholcss male (Bennen 2003).6 These forgivcrs rend ro be colleagucs, busi
ness pann€rs. or casual friends: they lbrgive after they fail 10 collaboratc appropri-
arely on shared projecrs, break pmmiJics or conrracrs, and forger ro repay bomowed
money. In other \rords. they behave vcry much like lhe (male) herols ol classical
liberal thcoryrautonomous. independ€nr, uiomisric agenrs, who dcliberrtely choosc
to engage in sharcd proiecls for mu lual bcnclit ard advantage. Criswold cofirments.
almost in pas$in8, lhat rhe conscnsus against ihird-pafty ibryiveness is promised, in
part on prcsLrnubl) non-conlro!ersial conrmon scnse moral individunlism. wheLc
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indiliduals arc undersrood to be atomistic moral uni$ (Griswold 2007, I l8). Yel
this assumption ignores several decades ofwork in feminist theory, which has intro-
duced, critiqued and revisql the insigh Ihai our agcncy as individuals is often con
sliruled,at least in pan, by our rnost meaningful(and ofien unchoscn) relationships.
The poinl is nol lo devalue autonony or individualily, but rather, to relhinkexactly
in what these values consist.
When women do appear in thc literalure on fotgileness, lhey lend todo so in onc
oltwo guisesi first as $e abused wifc or viclim olslxual violence (Holmgrcn 1993,
Boss 1997. Haber 1998. Murphy 2003). lntercslingly. these examples are always
invoked :rs the quintessential case of prcblcmatic, disingcnuous or even pr"dlr-
torgivcnessr they are deslined to fail because, clearly, such women cannol possi_
bly forgi're and meanwhile possess (let alone cxprest seli'rcspect. Second, women
appearasthe motherwhose agency is so deeply idcnti6ed with herchild that she can
tbrgivcas him 
-1he apparenr cou nleFexamplc lo tle common-sense moral individ-
ualism' that preven$ (hird-pany forgiveness. MoLhcrandchildare theexccplion thai
prcvcs the rule, apparently, becausc the molher's agency is indistinguishable tiom
rhe child. She is so psychologically altuned to hcr carinS relalionship lhal she may
nol bea separare sclf ar all (Murphy 1988. Hablr I99l)
Why consider this paucity of female cxamples anything more ftan an unfortu-
nare f:rilure ofimagination? Among the polenlial v ices ot ideal lheory, according to
Charles Mills, are its misrcprescmarions of social onlologies and of moral capacilics
(Mills 20(X, 166). Examples matrcr because thcy rcveal lhe subjects of a particular
rhcoryi ro whom exactly it is meanl lo apply, and what sorl of people they are. Here
philosophical theories of tbrgiveness iall down on rwo accounls: first, in negl€ct-
ing women as lorgivers for the mosr part and second, in inlroducing fiem only to
demonsraie ,ad forgiveness, or lbrgiveness/,r olreff and not on behalf of ihem_
sclvcs. Insisting that victims ofwrong must already have regained their seli'respecl
bclore $ey can rightfully forgile may also attributc 'compleiely unreaUstic capac-
itics' to them (Mills, 166). Fu.thc.more, gendcrcd cxamples work so well in the
philosophical discourse because they fil the parudigms they 
'llustraLc, 
suggesling
lhri these loo are problematically ge.dcred.
Ceouinely considering cases where sexisl subordinalion and gendered violence
play a role is not simply a matler of staighlforwardly enumerating them, bul rather,
oftaking care to refleat aod accounl for fte agency and the voice of wonen within
them, not relyingon culiumltropes ofthc helpless batrcrcd woman or the fierc. and
selfless mother. And while there may wcll e,(ist an uncasy tension betwe€n pmc-
rices of forgiveness and self-resp€cl. choosinS a particular (gendered) exp€ricnce as
rypifying sclf-disrespecling forgiveness, $cn declarinS it illegitinale 
- 
alrnosl by
dcfinirion 
- 
is a deeply problematic solution. I have ditliculry s€eing such a theo-
retical move as achieving anylhing except lur$er diminishing the agency of rhose
women who do see themselves as forgi!ingi neithcr does such a move atbnd sum-
cicnrly to the reasons they offbr for rhcir decision. Women who da forgive in these
circumstances oiten d€scribe a complicated moralcalculation, it which self-respecl
is balanced against mearingful, cvcn constilutilc, noral relationships (Flanigan
1999).
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ls such a nanative a guaranrce l}Sainsr desperare or problemalic forgiveness? Oi
course nor. bul il does nor nced to provide a guaranree, in order to be of value. For
one fiing, aclually auendirg to viclim narratives may draw our alrenrion !o sophis-
ricared 'adaptivc sratcgics' for n:Saaning agency and a s€nse of conrrol (Brison
1999, 218). The assumplion that victims who suffer froln diminished self-reipecr
drc incapable of anything but passive erviliry is borh ?aronizing and inplausi
blc; it misrepresenrs fie momlcapacilies ofthe individuals ir claims ro protecr. As
Martha Minow purs ir, resroring dignily lo viclirns... should ar aminimum involve
respecting rheir own responscs' (Minow 1999. 8). Instead of creating paradigms
with self-respect wriuen in, phibsophers woulddo welltoalend to first person nar,
ratives offorgiveness, and $e €xplanarions rhar accompany them. For one thing, in
many cases, the lbrgilcfs seli-respect is not what has been damaged, but her trusL
and good will for anolher. Accurarely undeKranding fie po(enrial lalue of forgile-
ness, therefore, may rcquirc that we locus on its relarional asp€cts 
- 
and this in turn
draws our attenrion back to the rc tual relalionship in quesrion, in all its parriculariry,
.tnd away from abstract paradigms or ideal cases
ll.4 Imperfect Forgiveness
How can we theorize forgiveness wilhoul ideals? This may involve lillle nore
than Iooking carefully ar non-idealinstances of forgiveness. Philosophers may have
much ro lem from empirical studies, firsr-hand r€pons_ and even lirerary accoun$
of how and why peopl€ forgive. Consider, for inslance. rhe p;crure of decidedly
irrped€cr lbrgileness dcscribed in rhe following passage.laken from Dosroyevsky,s
The Brcthers Karana?or. Dmitry KarAmazov (Mrlya) is explaining ro his younger
brofier, Aloygha, why he will nol apobgize to his lover, Grushenka. When Aloysha
suggests $at Grushenka would tbrgive him. Dmh.y lakes the opponuniry to teach
hi\ lrrrle br^rhcr \.melhing of rhe relarion\hrp helseen $.ren ,nd me.t. and rhe
kinds of lorgivcne\\ it engendersr:
May lhe Lord prcscrvc you. my deurboy, from ev€rasking forgilcnes from a woDa. you
love. ifyou happcn to trc rn lhe wrong, Fom I wonranyou loreespecially. yes espocja y.
l{oNever nuch you nay bc in rhe srongl For a woman. ny dear fcltoq is rhe devit onl,
knows whai erl oa a crcaru.c. I a nn cxpc on ftem, at an, nre! Bur rry to re , wom.n
thil you r in lhe wrong l m sory. it s my frllt, forgive ne pleN, dd she l showq
you enh eproaches! She ll ocvc. lorgive yo! tankl, and opnly. bur sitt hlmiliale yo!
lo rhe la$ deg@, bring up things rhal ncler hap?encd. rcrcmber ewy hlb lhiog, tdget
nolhing, add $rerhing of hc. ow., and only Oen witl she forgiv. yd. And $afs ho*
tnc he$ ofrhem,lhe besr oI thcm. rilt bchave! ... A nan nu$ be nrsnanihous, a.d that
wonlslainhisrepulatio.lftwonrerenslaintherdpu(ationofahco,notcvenotaCacsnrl
But donl ever ask he. iorgilcn*s ior anything atl lhe sane. (Dosroyelsky 1958,69?)
This passage could well be said lo rcpresenr everyrhing thal is worrying k)
lbminisls abour discussions ol ibrgiveness. Nor onty are pejorarive gencralizalions
madc abour women as a group (rhcy arc manipulaLive, cmasculating, emorional, rnd
deceirful). but also a relalronship ol inequaliry and subrerluge bctween men and
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women is advocaied explicitly (nren may tbryive onc ano$er, bul rhey musr dcny
thch laults to women at all costs). Forgivcness enters the piclurc as one slralcgy
tor mainraining 
- 
or undcrmining thc appmpdately unequal rclarionship (Dmitry
docs not have similar rescrvations about women asking men for lorgiveness; in
these cases a man may bc magnanimous dnd gracious, in response). In the hands
ol women, forgiveness is an unscrupulous and unjust poweri lo ask lbrgiveness is ro
surrender power that ought nol (o be surrendcred. ForSivcncss is somcrhing tricky
and somcwhat dishonesr,lhis passage suSSesK-J!.v lile rrrur?r.3
In othcr words, forgiv€ness is presented as a gendercd trait. Female ibrgiveness
is problcmatized as deceittul rnd manipulativc, but ar thc same rime, women arc
described as forgiving whilc men are,infnannrorr. The tbrmer has very diftercnt
connorations lhan the laller. In Arislorle,lhc vinue ofmagnanimily is also ranslatcd
as pride, and concerns irself wnh 'grcar honori' (1999, I 124a5). The magnanimous
person isgracious and lenicnt wilh orhers because he can afford to be: his generosty
emerg€s liom an abundance ol power, not the vuln€rabiliLy of victim ization. Unlikc
tbrgiveness. which is premised on the idea rhat we are able ro hann and be harmed by
one anofier, nagnan;miry is rootcd in srrength rnd imperviousness. Sloics such as
Cicero and Scneca praised magnanimit! tbr rhis vc.y quality, llong with thc virrue
ofm€rcy (Roick 2008, Serrcca 1995). ln laot, the truly magnanimous pcrson may hc
incapablc of lillgileness, prccisely because of his impcr!iousnessi like Niclzsche's
lbrgerful noble. he is not capable evcn ol recall;ng thc wrongs of olhers (Criswokl
2007, 8).
The torgiving wonan is ar the samc rrme deeply rcsenti-ul, ind literally re livcs
('remembc.[s] every lirde thing . lorgelLsl nothing ) and re interprers rhe origin0l
Mrng ('brin8lsl up thingi rha( neler h:lpPned , 'addfsl something of her own')
as she rc rells ir. Nol onty is her forgiv.eness condilional 
- 
condilion$ she appears
intcnL on e.rrra.ri,e trom hcr untbnunate love. 
- 
but. Dmilry implics, condilions
appcar as if iom nowh€re and are added as shc goes along. On the orhcr hand, nulc
magnanimity is .r trait oI the slrong. elen the heroicr abrndant, uncondirional and
honesr Thc magnanimous man knows rhe rruth, riscs ahove rhc tiay, and ii llhnkl
and lopenl abour it from rhe beginning. In other words, he is me.cihrl.
There lre seleral oblious responses ro this passagei thc easiesr is pcrhaps lo
debunk the gendcred generalization it makcs: that the charscter ofwomcn asa group
jnclines rhem ro be mor€ rcscntful and less magnanimous than men.9 Ii my ana!
ysis of gendercd forgivencss is correct, lhc opposile is likejy to bc rrue: womcn
may have more rouble €xpressing ang€r, and l€ss trouble expressing empathy or
care. Ofcourse, thc (fictional) women in Dostoyevsky's passage are not particulrrly
paticnt. caring or empathclic: they display obsessivc rcsenhent, whose object is
rheir wrongdo.r's grov€ling humilialion. Thc abiliry lo cmpathize and the rendency
to resenl are nol incompaliblc: wc mighl even undersland rcsenrmenl as a naruml
rcsponsc Lo excessivc expcctarions olcare,
R€sentncnr as Dmiry dcscribes it is celrainly nor lhe noble sentiment describcd
by Rawls and Murphy. Instead, rhe rcitcralion of wrongs naratcd by resenl-
lul. forgiving-yet unforgiving women resemblcs resenlmcnt (or rassentime tl as
Nierzschc saw it: d€ccprive, malicious, emotionally poisonous, and an invrluable
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crcative.csource for those who are wcak. vulnerable, and lacking power (1967,
3?-39).10 Thcsc women re-narate the wrong, in all its shamefulness, cvcn as thcy
claim to forgive it. Moreover, this imerprerive naffaiion is pan ofrhe poinr ofrheir
forgiveness. Ralher than releasing rhc forgiven wrongdocr from the deeds of his
past (Arendt 1958, 237). their forgiveness is designed 
- 
in paft 
- 
rc rcmind him ol
them. Whatcver we may tbink ofDmilryt gender poliiics. rhc self rjghreous, guilt-
rnspifing for8ivene\\ hL des!nb(, r\ nor unismrlia.
11.5 Ambivalent Forgiveness
Evidenlly, Dosrcyevsky's passage does nor deicribc an ideal case ol forgiveness.
Whal exac y is wrong wirh the pid'rre Dmitry paints. according lo philosophical
ideals offorgi!iflgl In the firsr place, rhe lbrgiveness expres$d is not a purc change
of heani il is intenningled with and even consriruted by unresolved resenhenl Of
course, ifrcsentment were necessarily a moral, self-respecting responsc to wrongs,
then to rcscnt wrongs done is not necessarily a moral failing 
- 
folhwinS Murphy
and others, it would b€ a moral requirement 
- 
bu1 then, as I argued abovc, resenl-
mentalso turns out to be nrorc complicarcd and less upriShtthan Murphy allows. We
cannot always rely on its moral crcdibility. Dmitry's womcn rnayallo lail to exprcss
the self r?spe.rir8 resenhenl Murphy cndorses. We lack texrual evidcnce ro dercr
mine this absolutely 
- 
this is not cruschenka's nanarive. afrer atl, bor Dmilri's 
-
but given the plcading and apparenlly duplicilous tone attribuod to lhem, it is at
least plausible that lheir rescntmenr is grounded in fear and insecuriry, rathcr than
a robust and measured sense of rhcir own value. Furthermore, in rhis passage, for
givcness is a vehicle for resemmenr and not an anridore. Asany analyric phitosopher
of lorgiv€ness will tell you, Benuine or vi uous forgiv€ness is meant to overcornc
or cradicare iesenlment, not Lo disguise and exprcss ir. Insofar as rhe tbrgivcness
in this passage finauy drpr mark an end to resenltul dcmands fbr an apology, il is
unlimely 
- 
delaydl. The contrite wronSdoer is (al lcasl in his own eyes) asked lo
do too nruci. The forgiveness h€ finally rcc€ives is a hard,won r€spirc, and nol a
gifi ar all.
From the point ofview ofphilosophical ideals. at leasr, the scenc Dmirry paints
is thus an apparent failure of forgiveness. Being forgiven in this way would feel ?
whole lot like being blamed. ft is even whar we might call, fo owing J.L. Ausrin's
framework, an abuse or misfirinS oi rhe pcrlormative uuerance .l forgive you'. Thc
supposed fbrgiverfails to acconrplish thc moral rransfonnarion 
- 
whe$cr conceivcd
as release or reconciliation 
- 
thar utleranccs ofthese words are neanr to enact. The
resuh is unsatisfying for rhe recipienl, and unlikely to achieve fte almosl mimcu-
lous b€nefirs of forgiveness nenlioned at rhe beginning oflhis paper. Furthermore,
at least according to Dmitry\ interpretation, rhis failurc is a failurc of character.
rttributable lo lhe women themseives. Th€y arc 'dclil only knows whar sorr of a
creaturc', afrer all, and lack lhe approprialc vlrue to perform acIs of magnanimi!y.
rather than rcpressed resentmenr- Wom€n may urter words of forgiveness. bor rhey
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P€rtormarives can fail for m:my rcisons, howevcr. Here fo8ivencss ha3 appar-
ently fail€d (if it has failed) because the supposed forgivers are excessivcly and
inapprcpriately rcsentiul. Atler all. Dmitry has acccplcd the need for apology he
does not cven dispute tbar fbrgiveness is required; his warning to Aloysha is not !o
ask ibrgivcness ofa woman, even if he is ih the wron8. Bur Dmitry does display an
unspoken alsumption, even a scnse ofentitlement, that he himself is thc b€st judge
of whar kindsofconridon arc rcquiredofhim. Whd fruslrates him is his unwilling
padicipation in an ongoing process or dialogue. Whilc Dmilry would likc lo ult€r
an apology ancl be don€ with ir, his panner in this dialogue wanls something more
cxtensive; accountability as well as reconciliation. The mixture of forgiveness and
resentment that emerges is her stralcgy for negotiating bolh-
Women in l91h century Russia hved under gender ideals nol unlike ftose
describcd by V;rginia Vr'ooll Under lhe influencc of lhe Orthodox Church, thc
ima8c ofpiery, modesty and sclLdenyins enicc to lhe family and the unfonunate'
rcpresented the culmination of feminine vinue (Bisha 2002). Perhaps even more
than rn rhe contcmporary wcst, women werc socialized to express soft, yielding,
temininc rrairs while rejecting so-call€d 'negarive' emotions ofprotest and dcmand.
It seems plausible that tbey would be cncouraged rc cngage in forgivinS bchavior.
perhaps more than their male counierparts. BUL notice, in Dmitry's narrativei being
forgiven by women is an excruciating ordeal bccause lheir angry emotions are sur-
prisingly overwhelning 
- 
becausc they r€corr? ovcrwhelm'ng once forgiveness is
requ€sred. lf rhe quesdon of forgivcness is avoidcd ahogelh€r, it appcaB, lemal€
anger rcmains undercontrol. Thc ques on oftbrgiveness enables, even prompts it.
Wc can thus rcad Dmitry's women as grabbing the only opportunily available
ro henr. R€scntful, ambivalent firgivencss is nor a failurc, bul a subversive sral-
egy ibr brlancing seemingly incornpatible moral demands. The oullawed cxpres-
sions of prolest the need lo tell one's 
"n version ofthe story and hale il beheard, ro have one's hun amrmed and acknowledg€d, and Io have €xpressions of
anger b! acknowledged as wananred and legilimate 
- 
have b€en incorporated, even
rru88led, inro rhe socially and morally acceptable process of iorgivcnoss. At the
samc tirne, Dmitry allows, thosc women do fbrgivei 'and only then will shc forgive
you'. Thc value offorgivcness as a reparative slrarc8y is not sacrificed absolutely to
prolost. The women in Dosioyevsky\ passage are, quite simply, refusing $ choose
betwecn mainlaining rclarcdness and p.olesling injustice. The ambilalent forgive
ness thar emerges is an adaprive slmtcgy for negotiaring an impossible choice.
Norc roo, thar Dmiry lbcuscs on foryiveness betwecn inrimat€s: 'from a wonan
you k)vc especially.' Close, intcrpcrsonal relationships ol love are olten hosc leasr
likely to be governed by norms oljustice and righrs-claims. The wohcn described
havc consciously or unconsciously adopled emolional strategies ior ncgotiating
iniusticc without exning the rclationship altog€th€r 
- 
perhaps because thcy lack
thrl oplion, or pe.haps because they are balancing ils value akrngside lheir emo-
rional prore(. They demonstare an important insighr that philosophical paradigms
ove ooki sometimes, forgiveness can cxi$ alonSside lingering res€nlmenr.
Linda Ross Meyerdescribes al least one si(ualion in which fte $,ods, 'l forSive
you, bur I'm (ill angry' arc noi a contmdiotionr the case ofparcnts dcaling wilh
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children (2000, l52O). We can at least imagine fLrlly aduh examples of this kind
ofcasc, in which the forgivcr might say 'I do torgive you, but bcar wirh me it's
going lo take me some time $ ger past this. I hope you'll be palient,' or cascs whcn
a lcss prescient iorgivcr forgives, then inadvertenrly exprcsses resenlmcnl !t a later
dale. If she sincerely inrcnds lo forgile. and has made a genuinc effoa lo distance
hersell rather $an cndorse her original angry srancei il scems almosr churlish ro
ciaim rha( she has/dr'l?z/ ro lbrgive. Indeed, I expccr rhis parlicular cJ(pericncc
ftcasional, surprising momenG of rccalcirranl resonlmenr is morc common lhan
we might like to admit. Add to lhis a deeper layer olenrenched, deep-sefltd causes
tbr angcr, such as ongoinS social iniustice and oppression, and it becornes almosr
impossible 1c) read orpredict the moral compass' ol' indiv idual angry occasions. For
those individuals who consi.tntly receive mess.rgcs that they deserve lesr trom soci
ely, gnawing, undermining rescntment may be conshnlly presenl 
- 
and may cithe.
numhorinnarne the emotional prorc$ ofspeci6c. individual irjuries. Admirtingrhar
forSivinS is sometimes comparible with at leasl vnnc minimald€ree ofconlinuing
anger and rcscnrmenr means th.I mcmbers ofsocial groups who have good rcasons
ro teel angry, may slill havc occasion genuinely to lbrgive.ll F{rgivencss can be
arnbivalcnt and still bc rcal.l2
In my intcrprctarion ol Dostqelsky's passage, howcvcr. I havc gone one step
Iuaher. Not only are forSivencss and Gone degree of) rDsenrmenl cornpaliblet in
some cases, one may adually enable lhe othcr. Campbell no@s lhal in rhe absence
of social uprake and acknowledgmenl, exprcssions of anger and resenrmenl may
bc unrccognizable as such, even to their bea.c! (1994, 54). Ironically, rt may only
bc through acccpicd pracrices oi ti4ivcncss rhar menrbcrs of subord inaled Sroups
are evcn arlp ro become angry (wrth all rhe power and legitimacy conleycd by ftat
word) 
- 
lct akrne in the riSht wa), at rhe righr rine. and rowad !h€ right obiecrs, as
in the casc of virtuous anger. At rhe sam€ ine, ariculating and €xprcssing anger
may frcc i victim to forSive, should she so desire. Docs forgiveness nccessitate an
(evenlual) end lo angry feclings? Nor necessarily. anymore than wc h c ro feel
angry betbre we can fo.givc.ln lbrgiving. we commrl ourselves to 'movc past'fte
wrong, and to repair whatcvcr damage we can. But nchher commihent precludes
r€sidualdist st or fie emeryoncc ofa ncw and possibly distanr relationship
ln other words, acls oftbrSiveness are.or always linear prcgre$ions away from
resenrment and Lowards olll reconcilialtun 
- 
bul rt is nol always clear lhar lhey
r/101L:/ be so. Insrcad, we somelimes find f(ryiveness mixcd in with rcsenhent.
Gheaus descrihcs this mixturc as rn emotional dialecrics' of rcsenlmunl aod lor
givencss. perttclly captu.ing the back and l.onh phcnomenobgy ol thc conloluled
emotional trajectory many ol uscxperience, in forSiving (2009).Instcad olconlrasr-
ing uncondilional. instanlancous lffgivcncss with conditional forgivenc$s, premiscd
on a pre-o.daincd ser ofconditions thai havc aheady been achicved, wc can under
sland thcsc aslimitcases. marking theouter limils ol! much widerrange olpossible
Forgiveness ;s not always Ih! right stat€gy lbr dcmanding acknowledSment, of
coursci $mctimes rhe rclusAl to lorgi!c is hr morc powcrtul, espccially when for-
givcnei$ is cxpecred or cvcn $i,unred, is nr(nc clltctive.lr BuL in eithcr case. rhe
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practice of granting, receiving and withholding tbrgivcness functions as a sphere
in which wrongdoing is articulated and fo. which someone is made accountabl€: it
makes nosenselo say, I iorgiveyou, andIrhink you did nothing wrong ,afterall ln
some, iinol allc6scs, this sphcre is a promising a!enuc lbr neSotiating responsibility
alongside reconciliation. Funhermore, the sottel and less rctribulive discou.sc ol
forgiveness may make il available ro a wider range ofindividuals, includ;ne women
and members of subordinaled groups who are socialized to avoid more aggressive
forms of protest. Far from closing offavenues of accounlability, a discourse of for-
giveness may even enable thcm.
ll.6 Concluslons
This papcr makes a preliminary case ibr trcaring ibrgivcness 6lst as a (porcnlially)
valuablc sel of moral practices, rather than as a moral ideal - ot scl of ideals Acls
of tbrgiveness mny express virtues oi compassion, trus(, Sencrosity and wisdom
Equally. they may bo p.obl€madcally unassuming, tailing lC) plotesi wrongdoing
sufficiently or priorilizing the maintenance of moral)y dubious relalionships over
self-respect. The panicular range of cases to which I have drawn attertion, in this
paper are lhose acls of forgiveness that appear to be both valuable and problematic:
their problemalic nalure does not dilutc the former, anymore than their value over_
comes rhe larler Negoliating how to assess or advocale acts of forgiveness requirus
$al we look lo lhe particularilies oftheconGxl in which it occurs, m$er than impos_
ing a p.c-ordained s€t of ideals or conditions. Moreovcr, the conlcxl offorgilencss
includes the broader polirical conlext oi Lhe wrong includinS, for example, lhe .ole
ofgender polilics. The gcndered history of forgivcness as a moral concept may give
women parlicular rcasons to be wary ofexhortations to forgive Finally. we should
becarefulnotto ass!me lhar unproblematic or 'easy' cases of lorgiveness have more
value than rncssy or 'imperfecf forgiveness thal is, value to the individual partic
ipants, as well as value to the philosophers who sludy thcm. 'M€ssy' forgiveness -
rhar is. ambivalent, uncerlain and somelimes inconsistcnl strateSies ofrepair may
promote th€ good wheo paradigmatic forgiveness is impossible- Funhermore' as
the passage from Dostoyevsky demonstntes, morally complicaled foryiveness may
rev€al insights notcaplured by paradiSnaric cas€s. Evcn slpposcd 'failures' of for-
giveness nay revcal lhemsetves lo be sublle and soPhisticaled mcthods for balancing
compering valuesolrespect, accountabilityandrcconciliathn
Notes
l. In this papc!.ldiscuss forgilcness lron lhe petspociiveofScnd*oPpresion bu!mvanalvsis
is poiciially Ilpplhable ro qusrions of fotgivenes in rchtion roothq rorms olinjusricc. For
di$u$ion! oi fotSiveness in nce relalions, pletsc sc Howard Mccarv. Forgivencss and
Slawry (Mcca.y and Lnwen t992J. Sea 
^tso 
Akne'n nt dad foBi'.nes: A N.v Mdtet lt
ald.t R.,r'.rn,r by Roy Btmtis (2004). A clNric discosion of loBivcness i. fte cotrte(
or goup ar@ity rmlins Simn vieseirhal s fid St/t/,4'"' ( 199?)
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2. While I ad lrrgely crirical of Murpht s approach Io forgivenesr, the crution that he and
Brudholmenploy-and$eirdeienseoi untorgiveness andlcscnrmenl-isanimponanrand
rimely rcsponsc lo 6c lbrgiveness mania rhat swcpt academiu, following the Sourh Alrican
Trurh and Reconoiliilion Commission (Muryhy 200], Brudholn 2008) Maphy aid thos
qho lgrc wilh hirn slc lhenrsclles as a acting not de possibiljly oi lbrgiveness btrt the
drJ,,i/rn,, or thc cxpocl6lion oI forgiveness.
3. For fudhe! .ddcal di$u$ion of care and o$$ feninine' !in!es, sce Sarah Hoagland s
Lsbidn Ethi6: Vword N.t v.i!.s ( 1988) and also Fnedmai and Ci!d\ cirical discr$ions
in tuei.. a"d C.t (Hetd t J.
4. Inrcrcsringly. Exline observcs rhat whcn nen e encoudg€d lo engge eqDrheticalty *ilh
the wrcngdq (by rem.mbering sinilr offcNcs of lhcir own), lhc gc.der gap dnatpeffi:
lhe gendercd difcrcncc in fdgiling energes frcn diflering lscls of e,hp.lhy. woNr. who
wre mrc lilcly ro€rprc$ empa$y frcm lhe bcgiiDiig, did nor exp.ricnc. ao i.cras in
Iorgiline bcha!ior when prompled ro rhinkof$ci.own pa(offenccsi ifanything, &ey were
likely robc heshcr 
- 
hence rhe disappearance ol rnc gcndc!gap.
5. ForadisDssion ofwoilen and anger, pleasc se Bell. Angc., Villue and Oppre$ion'in thh
6. I would be remis$ iD makinF rhis claim if I did nor acknowlcdgc that while I descibe rhe
na.jodry of nriisrca phibsophical qrnings or forgivcnc$, thcr.6E notable often ien
inistJxcoplions lolhistend. includingJoan Hampton, Claudia Cald and Mdgarel Walker
7. Dmitry is caughr in a rotuous and complicated love rianglc wirh Crush€rki and his one-
tine firncde, Kalc.ina. Hc is ils on trial for nurdering his tutho. I anr nor o specialisr in
Dostolevsky o. Ru$ian lilenlore, and I do notprcte.d to offcr an ruftoritrlive inrerprcrarion
of this panicul& pa$ag. in ns lnenry comext What inrercned ft whcn I liFt @d rhis pas
sage. howevc( was how instNntlJ intuna,j.ne aul alio pktusibL. n Mi. Thc pictur prescfled
of how womcn lod mcn foBive one anorhd or .clatc ro cacn oficr mrc genqally is
not inconsi$e wilh rhe narnlives efleded ao Euro Amqican popllar psycholosy, self-helD
boots md womcn s magaziRs. and elen in de cx,nples and rhorghr.experih.oK found i.
analytic philosophy on forgircness.
8. That lorgilcncs mdy lcqoirc de.eplion is nor always hcld as a srrikc rg.inst it. Jean Bcthke
Ehhtain d$clibcs foryivenes as (vinuols) willcd rorgdting and Julid Driverinclrdes ror
silcncs among r class oi linues she calls 'vinues of isnoranoe' (Driv* 2001, Elshrain
2001). Since I cannor actually bc ignoent of Bhrt n is I am toryiving, il I dm lo forgile
i! rhe ignorlncc invollcd h inGntional.
9. Thc irony ofchoosing lhis passogc docs not escape ne: having advocated torNomen's loices
inphilosophicrlffgumcnr,I turn nos ro a maleaudor, whose ficlionalmalechatucrer leclues
another male on gcndc! politics. thDugh a senes of sweepiiS and misogynislic generalia-
tions. In onc way. I se mrself as uncoredig rh€ Gilenccd) fcmalc voiccs in D6blelsky
bur rhis could al$ be a r.,trri,, dd drr"./"D of rhc m.d I dcscribc in rhe m.i.srtun
philosphiol liteouE on lorgivenes.
l0- Nieushe describrs thc ardic ideat (rhe sysbn ol vilues deared by u.rj.nrtadtri in emn
a one ,,/.c edudile charn, r touch ot n rbil"a" io hn ncsh. rhc aneelic look of a plump
p€uy aninal (196?.9?). Ar vmious poiits in his w.iriigs, Nictzsche cn s vomen as likely
to espousc (and benefit irom).culrure of rers.n,tr.,r.
ll. It is intefsting to notc thot the definnion of forgiveness !s olercoming resemnenr', nBr
m.de lamous by MuThy anddominant in de philosophicdllitcraturc for some rimc, is actu
dlly brsed on d lcxtralsisreading. Murphy claims fiat hc'Iollowt Bishop Builol in hh
definnion ( 1988, 9)i jn lhcl. Joseph Budert sermon s on rescntmcnr and fo.gileness allow
thatforgivcnels iscompaliblc vith a modcrate levelolresenlmenr, Forgiving hcanscurbing
exce$ile esentncnr, and limiting one s angr! p*ceprions ro what tn! good peson, disin-
t.esred in rhe casc, miShr lcel aboul the wrong (Burlc! 1949. 143). Tnis dclinnion s obli
ously amenrblc to. linue-eftical analysis. From a fcminist ccriti.al persp.ctive, howovc..
the quesrion r€mains: who is lhe nindard for the good disiokrcsted individnal? Denn
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ing rnger ii remsof a disintresred individurl suggesB thar $e individull i.rcrcsls ol thc
resen€r cainor themseNes function.s a aananr ior heremotions. lfthc wrone or injustic€
is nol yer recogni4d by her moral comnrunity (e!e. ihe orheNise good rnd disinterested
nrenb€ts oiir) hoqevei rhcn her.nger is not only illegnimalei il h illegible.I sec lhis as a
kindoi monl failuF described bt CheshieCalhoun(1999. 89)
12. Anca Che.us alsodiscussed rhc value olambilaleni forgilenes (Gheals 2009).
13. Al the risk oflallilg inlo tho rap ofelyingon lypical exafrples ofwiles fo€ivine iusbands,
I was Eminded of this point folloeing forner New York Covernor Elioi Spitdis prostitu-
rion scandal, apology rnd evenrual resignarion. At the time,lhere was a gre.t deql ofhedir
arcntiononlhc'ev€r-fo.eiving'polilical spous 
- 
or more accurately. political wife. When I
enecl on th€ siluaton facing suddenly fanous polilic.l wives like Silda WallSpitz€ro. Clin-
ron or Dina Mccreevey (whos husband, lomer New Jo6cy Gove.nor J.nes Mcoeevey
resigned lfter confe$ing ro an affln with a male co-worker), il seems lo me thr! $ere exisls
such an expecurion ofat 1e.$ tdlic forgilencs, any spouse who reiused to lorgive world
mako a powerful, elen shocking, stalemcnl
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Chapter 12
Feminist Political Solidarity
Sally J. Scholz
Abstract This anicle examincs some oflhe conceptual hisrory ol collective polil-
ical action within timinisr movements beginning wirh sis{erhood and moving lo
teminist political solidarny. I argue that feminist polhical solidarity is built on a
commitmenr by individuals !o forn a unity in opposirion kr iniustice or opp.ession.
Thrce moral relalions emerge from this understanding offeminisl political solidar
ity: the relation to fie cause, the relation among members of Lhe solidary group,
and the relation between the solidary group and the largcr sociely. These relations
evoke cerlain obligations and responsibilities which I prescnt and defend. Feminisr
political solidarily is informed by the pa(icula ties ofihe cause and thus any theo-
retical accouniofthe moral obligations is necessarily limited, bur by lookingarihese
three relations together with a sociol€ical account of transnational feminist polit-
ical solidarity drawn from Clarc webeas sociological descriplion of the women's
Empowerment Proiect, a clearcr picture of some of the moral requiremcnK of a
commi(menl ro leminist political soUdarily emerges.
Keywords Politicalsolidarity MuLualiry Activism.socialcriticism Coalitions
One of the primary inlerests of feminists is developing strategies for collective
aclion to bring aboul social change. In this article I brie8y examine some of the his-
tory of the call Lo solidarity wilbin feminist movemcnts wilh the aim ofhighlighling
three primary molal relarions thar emerge f.on feminist political solidarity. Polil-
ical solida.ily is built on a mutually undertaken collectile commitment to a cause
in opposition to perccived injuslice. As such, three moral relalions suggesl them-
selves:1he relation to thc cause. the relalion among members ofthe solidary group,
and the relation between lire solidary group and rhc larger society.In my book, Polir-
icdl Solidddrr,I offer an extensive discussion of thcsc relaiions and their incumbenl
duties as I develop a theory ofpolitical solida.iry. He.e.I explore feminisr polilical
solidarny as an inslance or applicat;on of that fiamework. Any given inslance of
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